COMMIT/

Beyond the Dutch EPD

Towards physician-controlled decentralized medical record exchange

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History and context

Early developments: GPs and computer hobbyists in the '80s

' 90s Erasmus University (Rotterdam) – EDIFACT / MEDEUR (Johan vd Lei)


OZIS – regional pharmacist rings and GP rings for information exchange – MEDEUR over mail

MEDEUR used for many types of message: specialist, medication etc.

Healthcare Reform

- ~ 2000 new health agenda: 'market reform' for healthcare emerges
- ~ 2003, work on switching point commences
- ~ 2005 pharmacy market 'liberated' (pharmacist no longer dossier-keeper)
- ~ 2008: "opt-out" letter for switching point (before law!)
- ~ 2010/11: law proposal 31466: opt out rejected!

Dutch switching point



Centralized registry and access control (RBAC) UZI smartcards (no patient cards),

Hospital specialisation: LSP ensures access to records when patient moves (or is directed) to another hospital. The argument for *pull* at its core.

Advantages touted

- Always up-to-date record access
- Ease of use
- Emergencies
- Logging available to patients
- Avoid telling same (patient) story twice
- Patients would be able to view own records (still does not work)

Risks perceived

- Risks of attack: (breach of switching point core) and/or at the endpoints
- Decrease of autonomy (Gps)
- Snooping, feature creep: future access by ...?
- Motion after senate rejected law:
 - Stop gov't involvement
 - Strengthen regional systems (security)

Do not underestimate...

- Convenant between nearly all health and patient organizations and ICT vendors
- Payed by health insurers (~25MEuro/yr)
- Doctors (must) ask patient consent, %...
- OZIS "phased out"

2014: court case GPs (VPH, ~10%) Medical secrecy at its core:

- central vs discretionary control
- overly broad (general?) consent

Claims rejected, now w/supreme court

Government has no formal role, but...

law proposal 33509: patient rights for health exchange (in senate now)

- "specified consent"
- consent can be shared and 'observed' through health exchange system
 - effectively could be large "green button"

Amsterdam Initiative



GP Huisartsen Kring Amsterdam (HKA)

- critical since ~2008
- voted against restart in LHV, 2013
- wanted "small" (specific) opt-in variant
- + asked UvA to think about regional alternative (now in pilot phase)

I deas for alternative

- Decentralized control: healthcare professional decides (with patient),
- only share data when needed (mimic push communication in terms of control)
- No data (transport) visible "outside" practice
- "Small" specific consent, if needed
- GP at the center
- GP post considered most important application for now

Considerations

Need to solve problem for GPs now..

..as 'privacy by design' as possible

But needs to also cover more cases
towards the future, cover 'LSP cases'
(e.g., pharmacists, emergencies) to
make impact – and help healthcare

Whitebox

Small computer (ARM-based board, running Linux) in GP practice

Whitebox generates URL + registers policy per document / patient

- issue URL to GP post automatically (default)
- have user (or GP system) disseminate URL manually, e.g., to authorize



Pharmacist or hospital

Alternative: decentral control



Capability encoded as URL: locator and authorization token at once

Identity based capability: coupled to key (healthcare smartcard, pre- or late binding)

Policy at the source enforces access rights Whitebox coupled to GP system internally

URL / capability

https://amc.med.nl/ProfSumm?patid=1234567&doc=123&t=987klajf098u2

URL encodes access rights:

https://amc.med.nl/.../RO=y/

Readonly, read-write/append


https://amc.med.nl/.../copyable=y/


Copyable is right to autorize (make copy of URL for) other healthcare professional

















Always someone (current capability holder) responsible for authorization




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
Always someone (current capability holder) responsible for authorization



Push "backlinks" back to source (i.e., GP)



... around the patient



... around the patient (may vary over time) Hospital (e.g., ER) Hospital chain of care ward Pharmacist patient


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Advantages


- Scales around the patient: not tied to region or country
- Access (and access related risk) does not scale "with the system's scale"
- Embeds humans as responsible actors: active decisions to *push* authorization
- GP / health professional at the center
- Follows healthcare workflow by default
- Pull access, but controllable like push, and without disadvantages of centralization

Medication reconcilliation (note difference with push)




Starting point: GP and pharmacist know patient's med.record;

Medication reconcilliation (note difference with push)




Patient referred to hospital; time=0. Referral letter sent

Medication reconcilliation (note difference with push)




Hospital admission: +6 weeks.

Medication reconcilliation (note difference with push)




Hospital admission - 2 weeks pre-surgery screening at hospital; Hosiptal admission - 3 weeks: request medication overview patient

Medication reconcilliation (note difference with push)




Patient at pharmacist or GP: checkup + medication review

Medication reconcilliation (note difference with push)




(Patient checkup + medication review could be online)


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


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
Patient/GP worried about missing information in emergency?

1) GP-post route




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
2) External service = real "pull"




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
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


Patient/GP worried about missing information in emergency?



Why acceptable?

- 1) there may actually be real use cases
- 2) proportional: only if needed, w/consent
- 3) specific consent



Summary

Default cases: active "push authorization", one-to-one, URLs bound to UZI cards Capability model: can allow chain authorization, assuming policy permits Use cases for pull access covered Proportional: only scale out when needed Access organized around patient Always consent if more than 1 person not directly related to care authorized

Questions, remarks

Soon: https://hka-pilot.nl/

